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Menace on the borders - Al- Ahram Weekly. The jihadists have mastered the art of filling a vacuum. Whenever friction or turmoil weakens the fabric of a state, they step in. And when chased away, they wait on the borders, regrouping until the time is right to enter once more. The intersection of jihadist operations and smuggling activities may give rise to rivalry, but there are also shared interests. What helps them is that more often than not the inhabitants of the peripheries of a state tend to harbour long- term grievances borne out of the neglect of their areas by central government.
Patterns of jihadist activity follow almost predictable geographical lines, and the response to these activities should examine these lines. Which borders are the most porous and least controlled by central governments? Where are the traditional smuggling routes? What tribes or local groups depend for their livelihoods on smuggling? Questions such as these must be asked by analysts trying to forecast or forestall jihadist activities. The Iraqi- Syrian border has been the area that has attracted the most headlines, but the Sahel- Sahara region has been just as active and links between the two battlefields are not hard to discern. A Dennis the Menace Christmas, Jack Frost, George Balanchine\'s The Nutcracker and Richie Rich\'s Christmas. This special collection includes: South of the Border, Down Mexico Way, Mexicali Rose, and Gaucho Serenade South of the Border:On the eve. In the attack on the In Amenas gas facility in Algeria two years ago, Al- Qaeda- affiliated assailants reportedly had access to hideouts across nearby borders, both in southern Libya and northern Mali. Its spectacular victories have been attributed to the easy movement of men and material across the Iraqi- Syrian borders. Syrian- based jihadists have recently tried to exploit a similar situation along the Lebanese- Syrian border. The type of guerrilla warfare most suitable for jihadist militias can make easy use of such terrain. The French intervention in northern Mali, launched in January 2. They like mountainous terrain, if available, that deters access for regular armies. They also like having a potentially friendly local population that may harbour grievances against the central government and whose conservative mindset may intersect with the stringent interpretations of Sharia law that the jihadists wish to impose. The border areas jihadists like to settle in are often known for their rugged terrain or shifting sand dunes, which make it harder for central governments to bring law enforcement into effect. An examination of the border areas connecting Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Chad; Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco; and Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, makes this point. The boundaries between Jordan and Iraq offer militants no chance to hide from the security services of central government, as Maarouf Al- Bakhit, Jordan’s former prime minister, has pointed out. But the border areas in northern Mali have proved ideal for trafficking men and weapons to jihadist movements. In the past these same areas served as smuggling conduits for organised crime groups. Libya, whose stockpiles of Gaddafi- era weapons have become a kind of bonanza for jihadist groups, has a total of 3,3. The 1,5. 00- km border between Nigeria and Niger has provided ample room for the activities of the terrorist group Boko Haram. The Nigerian- Cameroon border runs for 1,6. Iraqi- Syrian border is 1,2. For example, Iraq could have been spared some of the worse predations by IS had the post- Saddam government been more even- handed in its treatment of the Sunnis and Shiites. Much of IS’s successes in the country has been attributed to the militants making common cause with disgruntled Sunni tribes. In Tunisia, an International Crisis Group study has suggested that the country’s police started having trouble controlling smuggling after the 2. Revolution. In 2. Tunisian police recorded 3,6. Social and geographical settings conducive to the smuggling of arms, drugs, immigrants and commodities — as in Sinai, Syria, Turkey, Mali, and Nigeria — have often offered a comfortable milieu for militants, who need a steady supply of cash, weapons and recruits in order to sustain their wars. One of the best smuggling routes in North Africa, for example, is the one straddling northern Mali, northern Mauritania, southern Algeria and southern Morocco. Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has reportedly forged strong ties with members of the Tuareg tribes, as well as the Polisario Movement, in North Africa. The Kufra region is home to successful smuggling operations that span Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Chad, according to a study by the US Institute of Peace published in February 2. The Oneness and Jihad group in West Africa, which considers itself an Islamist movement, is also known to be a front for drug- smuggling operations involving Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. In northern Mali, militants have made money by taking and trading hostages. Jihadists often demand either cash or the release of imprisoned colleagues in return for the freedom of such hostages. 0 Comments on The Border Menace Trending Top New The Border Menace 1934 Add to Watchlist Add to Seenlist Add to Blacklist Add to or remove from a custom list 0 Comments 3.7 N/A N/A Ranger Bill Williams goes to prison to get information on Chuck. The Border Menace (1934) on IMDb: Ranger Bill Williams goes to prison to get information on Chuck Adams. Then a fake posse chase gets him invited into Adams\' gang. Other Cowboy Stars — Bill Cody in “The Border Menace ” January 15, 2011 Pick a Durango Kid film. It’s almost certainly going to begin with some variation on the following legend, either appearing on a title card or read aloud. Overview of The Border Menace, 1934, directed by Jack Nelson, with Bill Cody, Miriam Rice, George Chesebro, at Turner Classic Movies. MPAA Ratings: Premiere Info: not available Release Date: 1934 Production Date: none available Color/B&W. Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar Al- Din, and Oneness and Jihad in West Africa all reportedly send their prospective members for training in these facilities. One can see this phenomenon in the Sahel- Sahara region, where Ansar Al- Din, Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, and AQIM have befriended members of the Tuareg tribes and made common cause with the Azwad Liberation Movement. In the triangle where the borders of Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Chad converge, conflicts among the Tebo, Zuwayya, and Tuareg tribes have offered jihadists a chance to play one group off against another. When he had to pull Libyan forces out of the Aouzou Strip in the 1. Gaddafi started persecuting the Tebo, who later helped to topple his regime. The jihadists actively train recruits and smuggle weapons across the borders, and are known to seek alliances with tribes that are willing to accommodate their goals. Another reason is that many tribes have members living across a country’s borders, making it easier for them to engage in smuggling and causing central governments to doubt their loyalty. In 2. 01. 0, Tunisian youths in the Ben Gerdane area on the Tunisian- Libyan border staged an uprising after the border was closed at Ras Jedir. The closure threatened to deny them their main source of income: smuggling across the border. Examples can be found on the Egyptian- Libyan borders, in Sinai, on Sudan’s western borders and on the northern borders of Chad and Mali. But in recent years the phenomenon has been complicated by the spread of Salafist or ultra- conservative Islamist doctrines among local populations. Evidence of Salafist sympathies in Marsa Matruh in Egypt can be seen by the overwhelming vote for the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, in the 2. Abdel- Fattah Al- Sisi, two years later. This is a fact of regional rivalries that the jihadist movements have exploited to the full. The Darfur conflict in Sudan is also believed to have generated some interest in jihadist circles. Border conflicts between Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon also paved the way for the rise of jihadist activities on their borders. And even before the Arab Spring, examples abound of governments aiding insurgents in the peripheries of rival states across the Middle East and the Sahel- Sahara regions. But rather than settling permanently, they hop across borders to regroup until they have a chance to strike once more. For this strategy to work, they need to stay on the good side of local communities, on whom they rely for supplies, communication and often recruits. Seifallah Bin Hossein, aka Abu Ayyad, leader of the Tunisian branch of Ansar Al- Sharia, has also moved to Libya, where he is said to be in close contact with Libyan militants. Experts believe that jihadist groups operating near the southern Libyan borders also regard their presence there as temporary rather than permanent. In this case, the jihadists abandon their nomadic lifestyles and settle in what they declare to be an Islamic emirate or state. In northern Mali, before the French pushed the jihadists of Boko Haram across the border, they were the masters of the border area straddling Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, with Kanama in Yoba State serving as their main centre of command. From there, Boko Haram started a campaign of conquest in Niger and Cameroon in the course of which it seized the city of Malam Fatori in November 2. In doing so, they seized banks and oil fields, imposed taxes and generally became self- financing. Al- Nusra Front, the official branch of Al- Qaeda in Syria, also controls a considerable chunk of land near the border with Jordan. If forced to abandon a location, they often do so with a minimum of casualties and then regroup in a nearby area until it is time for the next battle. This pattern sees them crossing borders, linking up with associates in neighbouring countries, smuggling in more recruits, and seeking sympathetic populations to hide among, along with convenient hideouts and training facilities. Libya turned out to be a convenient location for the jihadists. The absence of a central government provided the right environment, not to mention the role of some of the local tribes that offered support to the jihadists. In Syria alone, nearly 2. Libya are said to be serving in Al- Umma Al- Islamiyya, a group that trains combatants to fight against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al- Assad. Some believe that this development is what led to the stiffer resistance Haftar’s forces were confronted by in the Benghazi battles in July and August 2. The group, which operates mostly in northern Mali, wasted no time abandoning its positions when the French attacked in January 2. A third group is believed to have taken refuge in Tillaberi, a stronghold of extremist groups in western Niger. Egypt is extra vigilant when it comes to the Libyan and Sudanese borders. Niger is closely monitoring its borders with Nigeria and Mali. And Jordan is closely watching its borders with Iraq and Syria.
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